Energy has always been politics. What is new is that it now comes with a price tag in the negotiating room.
In the past ten days, four energy moves have surfaced around the Ukraine peace effort. Washington relaxed sanctions on Russian diesel. Reports described an offer to Moscow that included frozen assets and a stake in Lukoil's foreign business. US envoys reportedly floated the return of Russian gas to Europe. And the US president accused Ukraine's president of not wanting to end the war, while criticising Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries.
Each move has its own logic and its own critics. Together, they point in one direction: energy is no longer the background to the talks. It is being offered, traded and priced as part of the settlement.
Most of what follows comes from the New York Times and other outlets, citing officials and people familiar with the talks, and I attribute it where it matters. Where I give my own view, I say so.
What is on the table
Diesel. On 9 October, after a call with Vladimir Putin, President Trump announced a diesel arrangement with Russia, and the Treasury issued a temporary licence the same day. Sanctions will not apply until April 2027 to Russian diesel already loaded on tankers as of that day. Mr Trump named volumes of 300,000 tonnes immediately, 500,000 in November and a million shortly after. He said lower prices for farmers and truckers were his priority. The announcement came weeks before the US midterm elections on 3 November.
The offer to Moscow. On 10 October, the New York Times, citing Ukrainian officials, reported that US envoys had offered Russia the release of up to 100 billion dollars of frozen assets, permission for part of Lukoil's shares to be sold to Middle Eastern investors and to companies affiliated with American negotiators, and permission for Belarus to export potash. In return, Russia would stop attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure and shipping. Kyiv did not reject the approach but asked for guarantees if Russia resumed attacks. No final agreement was reported.
Lukoil. On 3 October the New York Times reported that Lukoil, which values its international assets at about 20 billion dollars, is trying to sell them after Western sanctions. US envoys are acting as intermediaries, according to the report, and investors with close ties to the administration are expected to benefit. The envoys are not supposed to profit personally. President Putin raised the sale at a meeting on 5 September. The sale needs approval from the US Treasury, and proceeds would go into a blocked US account. A rival bid from a trading house was rejected because of its Russian history. I found no public denial of these reports, and no confirmation either.
Gas. On 17 October the New York Times reported that US envoys urged Ukraine and European governments to consider resuming Russian gas transit through Ukraine as part of a settlement. The logic, as officials described it: restored flows give Moscow a commercial reason to stop fighting and bring transit revenue to Ukraine. They also said they expect high energy costs to push European consumers to demand cheaper supply. The White House confirmed that its proposals include economic incentives for both Moscow and Kyiv, and denied that reviving Nord Stream 2 had been actively discussed.
The backdrop. On Sunday 18 October, Mr Trump wrote that Ukraine's president "doesn't want to end this war, and probably never did", and complained that Ukrainian strikes on Russian diesel refineries hurt fuel markets, including in the US. Both sides are hitting each other's energy sites. Russia has banned diesel exports since July, and the International Energy Agency estimates that its diesel output has fallen by about 30 percent.
The pressure on both sides of the Atlantic
Energy bills are now a political problem everywhere.
In the United States, diesel hit a record of about 6.5 dollars a gallon in late September, according to AAA, roughly double the level of a year earlier. A Fox News poll found that 61 percent of voters call gasoline prices a major household problem, up from 48 percent a year ago. Crude has traded around 100 dollars a barrel during the conflict with Iran. The midterms are expected to be close.
In Europe, the benchmark TTF gas price was about 89 euros per megawatt-hour on the morning of 19 October, up from about 81 euros at the close on 9 October. It first rose above 70 euros at the end of August, as fighting around Iran, tanker attacks near the Strait of Hormuz and an extended Qatari force majeure on LNG deliveries put Gulf supply at risk. Storage is the other worry: EU storage was about 65 percent full at the end of August, below the usual level for the time of year, and Goldman Sachs warned then that competition with Asian buyers could push wholesale prices towards 100 euros.
Then there are the streets. In France, student protests drew between about 160,000 people (Interior Ministry) and about 480,000 (unions) on 13 October, with thousands of people taken into custody. Belgium has had student protests and a union-led anti-austerity strike. Italian students have occupied schools in Turin and Rome, Albania has seen violent unrest in Tirana, and Greek students have camped in Athens over rents. These movements are mostly about education funding, housing and public spending, against a background of falling living standards. Nothing I found shows that energy prices caused them. They matter because they describe the political climate into which, by the account of US officials, the gas idea is expected to land.
The case for
Supporters of the approach, as reported, argue the following:
• Restored energy flows would give Moscow a commercial reason to stop military operations, and officials see the effort as a way to build goodwill with Moscow and lower global energy prices.
• Households and industry in the US and in Europe are under real strain, and cheaper fuel and gas help them now. The diesel licence is a direct attempt at this.
• Gas transit would earn Ukraine fees for reconstruction, and Washington could seek a share of proceeds.
• A halt to strikes on energy infrastructure would reduce damage on both sides, and Ukrainian strikes on refineries do move global fuel markets.
The case against
Critics in Kyiv, in Europe and among US senators argue the following:
• Sanctions exist to limit Russia's revenue while the war continues. Easing them before a settlement rewards Moscow without any commitment from it. Ukraine's president called the diesel decision weak and said it prolongs the war. Several US senators called it a betrayal of allies.
• Europe has been cutting its dependence on Russian gas since 2022. The EU agreed a legal ban at the end of 2025, with a full stop to LNG from the start of 2027 and to pipeline gas in autumn 2027. A senior adviser to the German chancellor reportedly pushed back in consultations in Florida: Russian gas stays Russian, even if it is sold through intermediaries. The reported view across European capitals is firm opposition.
• 2022 showed what happens when supply becomes a bargaining chip. That is why the ban exists.
• The economic effect may be small. Analysts said the diesel licence would have little effect on prices, or would mainly redirect existing supply. And the Kremlin gains little in the short term from the Lukoil sale if the proceeds are blocked.
• Where people close to the process could benefit commercially, critics say the public needs a clear rule on conflicts of interest. The reporting says the envoys are not supposed to profit personally.
My reading
I am not a conspiracy theorist, and I do not think it is a masterstroke. I think it is incentives doing what incentives do.
Energy is the one currency that both sides can spend quickly and that voters feel immediately. A diesel licence can be signed in a day. A gas bill is read every month. Peace is slower and harder to verify. It is natural that energy ends up at the centre of the offer.
The trouble is timing. The benefits of this package are close: cheaper fuel before an election, lower heating bills before winter. The costs are further away: weaker sanctions leverage, a precedent for the next negotiation, and a Europe that reopens a dependence it has only just legislated away. Politics rewards the first and postpones the second. That is not a verdict on the policy. It is a warning about how it will be judged.
For Europe, the real question is not whether Russian gas is cheaper. It probably is, and a Bulgarian household facing a 34 percent price request will understand that argument at once. The question is who sets the terms afterwards, and whether Europe can say yes once and still say no later.
My test would be simple. If the peace is real and verifiable, energy trade can be part of it, in stages and with the right to switch off. If it is only a promise, the concessions are real, the peace is not, and the invoice lands first on European households. And whoever buys or sells assets in this process should be named in public. Transparency costs nothing.
Where it touches Bulgaria
Bulgaria is directly inside the Lukoil perimeter, and it is also a clear example of how the price pressure reaches households.
Lukoil. On 16 October the US Treasury's sanctions office extended by six months, to 24 April 2027, the general licence covering four Lukoil companies in Bulgaria: Lukoil Bulgaria, Lukoil Neftochim Burgas, Lukoil Aviation Bulgaria and Lukoil Bunker Bulgaria. The refinery in Burgas is run by a special manager. The Bulgarian deputy prime minister said the government had taken the necessary steps to secure supply and the smooth operation of the refinery. This removes the near-term cliff, since the previous licences ran to 29 October, but not the underlying question. The group's international assets are still for sale, and in August Bulgaria's economy minister said that Bulgaria was not an active participant in the sale talks, which take place at the level of the Russian holding company. I have not confirmed whether the UK has matched the new date.
Gas prices. On 13 October the public supplier Bulgargaz asked the energy regulator, KEVR, to raise its regulated gas price for November to 59.08 euros per megawatt-hour from 44.09 euros in October. That is an increase of nearly 34 percent, or almost 15 euros. The price excludes network fees, excise duty and VAT. Bulgargaz cites higher supply costs, including its long-term contract with Azerbaijan, purchased LNG and withdrawals from the Chiren storage facility, as well as recent price trends on European markets. The request covers all customers on the regulated market, including district heating companies and households. The regulator has not yet published its decision.
What to watch
• KEVR's decision on Bulgargaz's November price request. A date has not been published.
• 1 November: the date of the EU storage targets, which Germany and the Netherlands were at risk of missing as of late August.
• 3 November: the US midterm elections.
• 24 April 2027: the new expiry date of the US licences for Lukoil's Bulgarian companies, unless the sale is completed earlier.
• European reaction to the gas transit idea. The EU regulation lets the Commission suspend the ban for up to four weeks if energy security is threatened, but so far the reported response is opposition.
• Diesel prices in the weeks after the licence, which will show whether it helped.
What we do not know
Most of the detail comes from the New York Times and is not confirmed by governments. The White House has denied part of it. It is not clear whether the offers are linked, whether they are formal proposals or ideas floated in conversation, or whether either side will accept them. The timing against the US elections and the European protests is a fact. A coordinated plan is a hypothesis, and I have seen no evidence for it.
Energy has always been politics. Now it has an invoice. The question for readers is who will receive it.
Sources
• Malay Mail, 19 October 2026: Trump accuses Zelensky of not wanting to end the war (https://www.malaymail.com/news/world/2026/10/19/trump-accuses-zelensky-of-not-wanting-to-end-war-as-ukraine-strikes-russian-energy-sites/239653)
• Kyiv Post, 18 October 2026, citing the New York Times: Trump envoys push Russian gas transit in Ukraine peace talks (https://www.kyivpost.com/post/87418)
• Ukrainian News, 11 October 2026, citing the New York Times: US offer to Russia (https://ukranews.com/en/amp/news/1180444-u-s-offers-russia-usd-100-billion-and-oil-deal-in-exchange-for-halting-attacks-on-ukraine)
• blue News, 4 October 2026, summarising a New York Times investigation: Lukoil deal (https://www.bluewin.ch/en/news/international/kushner-and-witkoff-are-negotiating-a-multi-billion-deal-with-a-russian-oil-company-li.3624130)
• ProtoThema, 3 October 2026: Lukoil's 20 billion dollar deal (https://en.protothema.gr/2026/10/03/lukoils-20-billion-deal-the-oil-battle-uniting-trump-putin-and-gulf-billionaires/)
• KSAT / AP, 9 October 2026: Russian diesel and the midterms (https://www.ksat.com/business/2026/10/09/trump-says-us-to-get-diesel-from-russia-relaxing-pressure-on-moscow-to-ease-prices-before-midterms/)
• WJLA, 21 September 2026: Diesel prices ahead of the midterms (https://wjla.com/news/beyond-the-podium/surging-diesel-prices-add-to-affordability-pressures-weeks-before-midterms)
• Euronews, 31 August 2026: European gas prices above 70 euros (https://de.euronews.com/business/2026/08/31/europaischer-referenzgaspreis-steigt-erstmals-seit-marz-uber-70)
• OilPriceAPI, 19 October 2026: Dutch TTF live price (https://www.oilpriceapi.com/live/dutch-ttf-gas-price)
• Tacto: TTF price and recent trend, 9 October close (https://www.tacto.ai/en/energy/natural-gas-price)
• Daily Sabah, 16 October 2026: Student protests across Europe (https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/student-protests-sweep-europe-amid-anger-over-costs-of-living)
• Ukrinform: EU approves phased ban on Russian gas imports by 2027 (https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/4084369-eu-approves-phased-ban-on-russian-gas-imports-by-2027.html)
• SeeNews, 16 October 2026: US extends Lukoil sanctions waiver for foreign retail and Bulgarian assets (https://seenews.com/news/us-extends-lukoil-sanctions-waiver-for-foreign-retail-bulgarian-assets-1303138)
• Economic.bg, 16 October 2026: Bulgaria receives a six-month extension of the Lukoil exemption (https://www.economic.bg/en/a/view/bulgaria-receives-a-six-month-extension-of-the-lukoil-exemption)
• Eurocom, 13 October 2026: Bulgargaz proposes a 34 percent gas price increase for November (https://eurocom.bg/2026/10/13/bulgargaz-predlaga-prirodniyat-gaz-da-poskapne-s-34-prez-noemvri)
• Bulgarian Ministry of Energy, 12 August 2026: Licence to continue Lukoil's activities in Bulgaria extended (https://me.government.bg/en/news/licence-to-continue-lukoil-s-activities-in-bulgaria-extended-3897.html)
• Novinite, 13 August 2026: Lukoil assets in Bulgaria (https://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=240127)
